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REI"ATIONS WITTI TIIE ETJROPEAT{ T]NION
INTERGOWRNMENTAL CONFERENCE AND EN-
I.ARGEMENT
The EU Heads of State, who will hold an informal meeting
onZ}-Z3September in Majorca, will have the Interim Report (see
also pp. 9-11) on progress in discussions within the Reflection
Group which is preparing the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference
(IGC), at their disposal. Itwas prepared bythe Group's chairman
Mr. Carlos Westendorp, the Spanish Secretary of State for Euro-
pean Affairs. The Heads of State are not expected to draw any
conclusiong but their discussion could influence the second phase
of Reflection Group meetings which started in Brussels on 4 Sep-
tember and will finish ea 14 November.
The report underlineg for the attention of the Heads of
State, the importance of {Context and fimetable'. This could
result in a changed approach to the IGC, and consequently may
substantlally influene the attltude touards tle timing and
posslblythe terms of thenextenlargementto the EasL Itwill only
be the EU formal summit in Madrid in December, which will take
a position on the IGC. However, should our reading of Mr.
Westendorp's progress report be correct (together with our un-
derstanding of hints suggested by him since 5 September), it could
be possiblethat Member Statesmay attempt to concludethe IGC
rapidlyand limit the IGC onlyto the revision of theEU Treaty. The
aim of the IGC would be to allow a rapid start to the enlargement
negotiations.
This could facilitate the possible beginning of the enlarge-
ment negotiations to as early as late L997 /begnnrng of 198,
although perhaps this may be too optimistic. It is conditioned by
the possibility of reaching an agreement among the member
countriesthat the bulk of the EU reforms (except the institutional
system and the decision making process) would have to be
negotiated among the member countries only after the IGC, and
inconjunction with the alreadyinitiated enlargement negotiations.
On the other hand, old hands in Brussels probably already feel in
their bones the Communit/s tpical inclination to such a type of
decision. It appears that Westendorp's Group already agrees
that the necessary reform of the lrey pollcies (CAP, structural
funds etc) does not rcquirc a change of the legal base ie of the
EU Trcaty, and that it would be preferable, that it is handled
separately from the IGC.
(contintud on pge 2)
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*t" ilhi"l"ader tries to argue the possibility that the
EU Heads of State could begin to consider the need
to conclude the IGC as early as possible to avoid a) its
cumulation with other important issues, and b) limit
the reform ofprincipal policies to only the correction
of certain policies to allow enlargement. Thus the aim
of the IGC would be to approve the necessary institu-
tional reform. This can no longer be postponed be-
cause the major challenge of the future enlargement
will be in the area of institutions. This implies the
reform of the decision making system together with
the allocation of the number of votes to individual
member countries; the reform of the rotation of the
EU Presidency; the change in the number of commis-
sioners etc. This itself is an enormous task, but the
IGC could avoid dragging out heated discussions on
the reforms of the EU policies for several years: from
1997 the EU Timetable would become too compli-
cated. The Agenda considerably surpasses the per-
ceived common good will for tough solutions, and
there is a likelihood of consecutive political crises
damaging the EU internally and postponing the en-
largement formanyyears. One of Westendorp's con-
clusions from thework of the Reflection Groupis that
the next enlargement represents both a moral impera-
tive and a major opportunity for Europe. Thus en-
largement must take place and must take place suc-
cessfully. To avoid the enlargement or damage it,
would create a serious crisis not only in the applicant
countries but also in the present Union. The Interim
Report points that most of the Reflection Group
considers that it is necessaryto separate the IGC from
the discussion over the reform of individual policies.
Otherwise the IGC would not conclude before the
Agenda gets over<omplicated. It seems that the
Reflection Group agrees that the respect of the
"acquis communautaire" is accepted by both the
current EU and candidate countries, together with the
principle of "deepening and widening". The Group
seems to agree that for example Article 116 of the
Treaty is the legal base for the CAP (it provides for
qualified majority decisions), CAP reform thus does
not require prior revision of the EU Treaty. The
impact of the enlargement oncommon policieswould
not be immediate, but graduallyspread over a number
of years.In addition, the possibilityto set up transition
periodswould weaken the impact of enlargement and
allow the Fifteen defence against the negative conse-
quences. But the main conclusion seems to be that to
mix the enlargement withthe reform of the EU would
be politically extremely sensitive. Discussions with
Carlos Westendorp since the beginning of September
singularly underline the importance the Reflection
Group is putting on the'.Broader Context and Time-
table": the IGC forms part of the broader context
whose individual elements are inevitably linked to the
reform of the Union. The Heads of State must con-
sider the relationship between the elements and on
this basis, in December, they would set the goals for
the IGC. The key elements and timetable are: 1.
Enlargement - major challenge and a moral
imperative;2. T[ansition to the third stage of EMU
- IGC shall avoid opening the issue of Economic and
Monetary Union. EMU must be realised along the
timetable in the Maastricht Treaty and under its
provisions (full respect ofcriteria etc);3. Renegotia-
tion of the EU's own nesources and the financial
perspective for 1999 and beyond - Compromise on
the Delors II Package (financial perspective for L994-
L998) allowed the signature of the Maastricht Treaty.
To link the renegotiation of the EU's own resources
with considerations of the costs of enlargement and
its impact on common policies is politically explosive
and could postpone the enlargement for a number of
years. Thus it may be politically more acceptable to
start renegotiations on resources and financial per-
spectives onlyafter the IGCand after the beginning of
the enlargement negotiations; 4. Analysis of the
impact ofenlargement on policies and resources - to
bring this analysis into the IGC could cause indefinite
prolongation. Overall discussion would get over-
complicated and linked to all possible issues and
interests; 5. Debate on a future Common Defence
Policy, and on WEU in connection with 199t
deadline; 6. Elections due in Member States inl997
and 198: This in particular refers to the issue of the
1997 UK elections, but overall it seems that to link
IGC with the elections could be a recipe for disaster.
On the other hand, the population would have to
accept the revised Treaty anyway.
Should this reading of the progress in the
discussion within the Reflection Group prove to be
right, the associated countriesmaystart to reconsider
their ideas on the beginning and the context of the
enlargement negotiations. The need to participate in
some way in the IGC (observer status etc) would be
less strong. On the other hand, a limited IGC while
allowing the early commencement of the accession
negotiations with alt candidate countries, could fa-
vour those who will be economically and politically
most fit to accept the acquis communautaire together
with EMU (with transition periods). Negotiations
with the other candidate countries could go on for a
number of years with the Union adopting the reform
of the policies and candidate countries increasing
their readiness for membership. (JZ) r
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STRUCTUML DULOGW IN AGNCWTTIRE
Ministen of agriculrure of the ossociued counties of cental ud
eastem Ewope will have lheirftnt "structtwd dialogue" meetingwith the
EU on the maryins of the EU Agricultural Council in Brussels on 2926
September. Agricalture will be ihe key issue in the future occession negotia-
tions, but the forthcomingmeetingis still not qected to concentote on the
likety difiiculties in exending the Common Agriculruml Poliq (Q4P ) to the
fuaue member countries. This meetingwill not deol with agiailturvl policy
chuges frcilituing he integwion of ihe associated connties hto he Q4P.
The fiuopeu Cqtmission is still wo*ing on the "agrianlatml venion of
the Wiu Papef' and this rcpoft is unlikcty n be finalizzd belorc mid-
Oaober.
Thus the Brussels meeting
offersthe opportunityfor the asso-
ciated countries to present their
current and medium term agricul-
tural policy. The Commissioner in
charge of Agriculture and the
Presidency of the Council will cer-
tainly profit from the meeting to
outline the scope of the on-going
reform of CAP, the results achieved
already and the medium term out-
look.
It will be recalled that during
the Essen Summit the Commission
was requested to present a report
on the reasons whyonly a few agri-
cultural quotas opened by the Un-
ion under the Europe Agreements
are fully used. The European
Commission completed this report
in late June and transferred the
report on the'Tu'iff Quota Utilisa-
tion by Central European Coun-
tries under the Europe Agree-
ments" also to the CEECAuthori-
ties. We discussed this report in No
7j,pp.$S.
The nel( step was presenta-
tion of the new report on the
sAgrlcultural Situation and Pros-
pocts ln the Central and Eastern
European Countries". This report
was released in late July, and in a
certain way it will serve as the basis
for the discussion during the forth-
coming fust joint meeting of agri-
cultural ministers, inspite of the fact
that itwi[be officiallyhanded over
only on Z/ September.
Thisreport does not give any
policy recommendation, but its
importance is in the fact that this is
the first working report on CEEC
agriculture officially presented by
DG VI of the European Commis-
sion (Directorate-GeneralforAgri-
culture). Thus it follows relatively
closelythe reasoningand the type of
background analysis which the
Commission would be using when
considering the problems and the
terms of the accession.
The report does not deal
with the costs of the future extension
of the C,AP to new member coun-
tries. However, its main importance
is that it implies that the costs are
likely to be considerably lower than
the astronomical costs e:rpressed in
other similar eartier studies. It dis-
pels the fear that in future, eastern
European agriculturd produce
could flood the EU market. The
report also seems to support DG-
VI's position that considerations of
enlargement are not directly linked
with the new and more substantial
reform of C.{P. This is partly be-
cause of the crisis in central and
eastern European agriculture. Ag-
riculturd production there is ex-
pected to grow i11 gorning years,
albeit at a slow rate. The associated
countries would have difficulties in
realising their agricultural potential
because of a lack of capital, farm
structural problems and especially
because of downstream structural
problems.
Ihus the main conclusion
ls that the assoclatedcountrles of
crntral and eastern Europe would
be less ln need ofa hlgh level of
ploe and lncome support for
thelr farmers, than taryeted as-
slstane for the restnrcturlng
modemlsatlon and dlverslllca-
tlon of thelr productlve capacity
ln agrlcultune and the down-
stream s€ctors and for improve-
ment of thelr nrral lnfrastruc-
turc.
Mr. Franz Fischler, Com-
missioner for Agriculture said on
5 July that the report suggests,
that accession of the central and
eastern European countries to the
EU will not be made without diffi-
culties, but that the key conclusion
to be dranm from the report is that
themain problems are not in agri-
culture itself,but that the current
agricultural problems in central
and eastern Europe are closely
linked toother sectors of the econ-
omy. Thus according to Franz
Fischer *a solution to the prob-
lems ln agrlculture ln CEEC
depends on the substantial
change ln the economy as such'.
The report itself (some 35
pages) is a summary report based
on 10 country reports covering the
nine associated countries of cen-
tral and eastern Europe and Slov-
enia which is in the process of
being associated. The individual
country reports deal with the same
topics with some minor excep
tions. Thus for example, the Polish
country report goes into some
details concerningthe evolution of
farm income, while for example
Czech or Slovak country reports
do not touch upon this rather key
issue. (carirudonge a)
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(see Fge 3)
Mqjor conclusions
1. The dif{icult post 1989/90
adjustment effort brought a fall in
output in both the economy as such
and agriculture. It will take decades
before the average income per
capita in CEEC would reachT 5Vo of
the EU's average. But there are
substantial differences between
individual countries. For example
Slovenia and the Czech Republic
are already at a level coming close
to that of Greece in terms of PPP
(purchasing power parity).
2. There was a substantial
decline in agricultural production
and a decline in livestock was more
significant than for crops. Some
bright spots start to appear.
3. Overall growth should
bring rise for food products and
thus have a positive impact on
CEEC agriculture. However higher
incomes consumer rcquirements
tend to favour the export of western
food and agricultural products.
Ihis ls documented by the success
of the EU food industry in CEEC.
Domestic CEEC industry is not
really in a position to meet growing
demand regnrding quality, variety
and in particular marlating of
products. The situation in individ-
ual countries differs, however.
4. Adjustment in agriculture
is far from completed, but there is a
trend towards stabilization and the
re-introduction of border protec-
tion and support measures, which
contributed to a rise in market
prices for agricultural products.
Overall agricultural prices arc still
well below EU levels.
5. Agricultural production
is likely to incrcase over futur:
years, albeit at a slow rate. Therc ls
a signilicant production potential,
which would not be easily realised
due to a:
- lack of capitah the self-financing
capacity of most enterprises is weak
and there are problems in the credit
sector. No functioning market for
land exists and administrative regu-
lations make it diflicult for inves-
tors to invest in agriculture;
- farm structural problems: farm-
ingstructures (small farms) as they
started to be developed in many
CEEC would, in the longer term,
be viable as an additional source of
income, but will complicate the
task of modernizing agriculture. In
other countries over-dimensioned
structures continue to exist, which
in the longer run would not seem to
be economically viable;
- downstream structural
problems: it seems that the report
finds that the biggest problem is in
the privatization, reorganization
and modernization of the food
industry. Overall, downstream sec-
tors closest to agriculture showthe
biggest deficiencies in transforma-
tion and lack international com-
petitiveness. It has been estimated
that even in those countries which
made the most important progress,
the necessary structural change in
downstream sectors will take at
least another 5 to 10 years.
6. Agricultural prices should
rise in CEEC in the coming years
and have been rising since 1992-93.
But lower prices are often related
to products of considerably lower
quality than western European
standards. There are limits to price
rises. Because of the high share of
food in household expenditures,
and because of relatively high levels
of inflation, a rapid increase in
agricultural and food prices would
be economically and socially dan-
gerous. The price gap between the
CEEC and the EU can therefore be
expected to continue to exist, even
if it will decrease more or less,
depending on the products.
The key part of the report
are projections of output, con-
sumption, and foreign trade bal-
ances for year ?-0{U0_ for both the
CEEC-10 and EU 15. In a way the
size of CEEC exportable surplus in
individual commodities and its
impact on the EU self-sufficiency
would be the key elements in the
membership negotiations. Projec-
tions generally show "unthreaten-
ing" balances, and even in the case
of cereals the CEEC-l0 exportable
balance has been estimated for
2000 at some 6m tons (and only
3.3m tons for CEFTA countries). It
is expected that overall in crops and
oil seeds, the exportable surplus of
CEEC would not grow between
now and 2000, and would not
surpass that of pre-190. In the
dairy sector the recovery would be
less marked and the net export po-
tential of CEEC would be signifi-
cantly lower than in the pre-transi-
tion period. The meat supplywould
be more balanced and at lower
level than in the pre-transition
period. r
COMMISSIONER BNTTAN SPruIKS ON "NE)(T ENI}IRGEMENT"
Commissioner Sir lron Brittan in his speech to Europapolitischer Kongress (organised by CDU/CSU
Group in the European Parliament, in Berlin on September 11) argued in favour of both, giving the
membership candidate countries "observer status" during the EU Intergovernmental Conference, and setting
up a date for accession negotiations immediately after the IGC without waiting for the results of ratification.
These views (and in particular the participation of associated countries as observers at the IGC) are
not officially shared by the European Commission. On 12 September the spokesman for the President of the
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European Commission pointed out that Sir Leon was speaking in Berlin purely on the personal basis and not
on behalf of the Commission" which in turn has no say over the arrangements for the IGC, as this is an exclusive
competency of the EU Council and of its Presidency. The Spokesman said that a number of the members of
the European Commission have "personal'views diametrically opposed to those expressed by Commissioner
Brittan in Berlin and this number includes Commission President Jacques Santer.
Sir Leon considers that "the main aim of the IGC should be to prepare the EU for enlargement. The
enlargement to the East has a political strategic and economic importance equal only to that presented by
the creation of the EC itself'. Sir lron admits that the change of the EU Treag is an internal matter, but at
the same time feels that to take an "all or nothing" attitude on this question could be short sighted. So far the
EU has offered the central and eastern,European countries informal briefings, but he feels that they could
be offered "a non-voting role as observers at the IGC".
The Commissioner said that the other big issue which needs to be considered is the Budgetary Costs
of Enlargement. Here the principal problem is agriculture. His argument is that if the EU continues to keep
prices high and the associated countries areunable to finance similar leve\ agriculturewould cause serious
problems during the negotiations. The long transition periods would probably not resolve the problem. The
candidate countries may accept that the CAP is not extended to new members, in order to speed up accessioq
butoncetheyarein,thiswouldmeanmaintainingbordersinsidetheEUandoperatingtwosystemsofsupports.
This would result in an unsatisfactory situatioq but perhaps this may be the only way forward xs "i1 might be
better to accept a long transitional period rather than to attempt a draconian reform of the CAP and delay
unduly the accession of the CEEC".
The Commissioner took a similar attitude on Structural Funds. In 1999 the financing of the EU is to
be re-considered and structural funds could be adapted in the light of enlargement. The eastern European
countries may also consider whether it is better tojoin earlier, without full Structural Fund assistance, or wait
*until their development renders the cost of applying the normal rules less prohibitive".
However, to Commissioner Brittan it is time not only to thin& in terms of the costs of enlargement, but
also in terms of benefits. He feels the need to assess the benefits of expanding the Internal market to a further
106 million people. His idea is that unless the EU is prepared to research and publicise the benelits of
enlargement, there is a difficulty that the problems which enlargement certainly pose will receive exclusive
attention. Sir Leon rec.alled the Cecchini Report on the Single market and suggested that an independent group
is commissioned to asses the overall dynamic effect of enlargement on the EU economy in terms of growth
and jobs.
BETTER OATLOOK FOR EU REI./ITIONS WTTH bUCEDONU
The prospect of strengthening relations
between the EU and the former Yugoslav Republic
of Macedonia (Fyrom) have substantially
improved since Greece and Fyrom announced on
5 September, their intention of resuming their
discussions. Fyrom's President, Mr. Gligorov,
told Commissioner Hans van den Broek on 6
September that an initial agreement with
Athenswould be signedin NewYorkby the Foreign
Ministers of the trro countries. It seems, however,
that this initial agreement will still not cover the
whole dispute as it would for the moment, leave
aside the delicate question of the use of the
name "Macedonia"l the agreement will, on the
other hand, settle the Constitutional problem and
that ofthe flag.
If this partid agreement is effectively signed,
the Commission could envisage several initiatives
regarding Fyrom, notably:
i) examining the possibility of establishing
diplomaticrelations between the EU and Skopje and
placing all relations in a new contractual framework;
ii) the granting of economic assistance;
iii) the qilension of existing cooperation with
Fyrom within the framework of the Phare programme
(whid at the present time, is limited to humanitarian
aid projects). Regarding the follow-up that is reserved
to action introduced by the Commission at the Court
of Justice against the Greek unilateral decision to
impose an economic embargo on Fyrom, the Commis-
sion will when the time conies, assess the situation and
draw the appropriate conclusions, said a spokesman.
In any event, the Commission considers that by fulfill-
ing its 'legal duty" under the Treaty, that is, by intro-
ducing action at the Court against Greece's unilateral
decision to introduce the economic embargo, the
"Commission has helped to establish the conditions
for an agreement", said the spokesman. t
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EU/POI-AND IOINT PARLUMENTARY CALLS FOR ACCESSION TIMETABLE
The third meeting of the
EU/Poland Joint Committee, on
September 6, co-chaired by W.G.
Van Velzen (N. PES) and the Pol-
ish MP Jan Borkowski, allowed for
an "open and frank debate" ac-
cording to Mr. van Velzen.
The Committee discussed
the work of the Association Coun-
cil, the functioning of the "struc-
tured dialogue", the interpretation
and implementation of the White
Paper on integration into the EU's
internal market. There was debate
on the appropriateness of already
setting a timetable for opening and
the unfolding of accession negotia-
tions, the preparation of the 191X
IGC, the development of thePhare
programme, etc. At the end of dis-
cussions (which, as Mr. Borkowski
said, were at times controversial
and "storm/'), the Parliamentary
Joint Committee adopted, through
a consensus, a series of recommen-
dations tobe submitted to the EU/
Poland Association Council:
i) the EU has to ensure that,
through its White Paper on the
internal market, it does not impose
on future Member States stricter
requirements than those fulfilled
by the current Member States,
especially regarding environ-
mental, social and competition
standards. Mr. Borkowski recalled
that Poland attached great impor-
tance to the White Paper's not
being considered as a legal instru-
ment creating new obligations, but
that it was a question of a "guide"
aimed at helping the Polish govern-
ment in aligning its legislation on
that of the EU. Mr. Van Velzen
said that discussions in the Parlia-
mentary Joint Committee had
shown that it was still too soon to
discuss all the legislative details or
a possible transition period which
could be granted; all these issues
will have to be dealt with during
negotiations themselves.
ii) a precise timetable for
accession may only be set once the
1996IGC is over. Mr. Van Yelzen
accepted that this recommenda-
tion goes clearly against what the
Polish Government has been de-
manding for several months, ie
already setting a detailed timetable
now for the opening and unfolding
of accession negotiations. "We
understand why Poland wants to
obtain, even now, a precisedate for
the opening of negotiations. It sees
in this, and rightly so, an important
source of motivation for the coun-
try as a whole. But we consider that
we should refrain from selling
them a date that is not based on
reality. This is why Poland has first
to perform its duties,just like the
European Union has first to per-
form its own." Nothing prevents
Polandfrom settingout and pursu-
ing its own timetable as regards
legislation alignment.
Another recommendation
by the Parliamentary Joint Com-
mittee, moreover, urges the EU to
fully respect the priorities and
timetable set by the Polish authori-
ties for implementing its internal
strategy for preparing accession;
iii) the current bilateral
cooperation procedures need to be
improved, especially the way min-
isterial meetings under the "struc-
tured dialogue" are run, as well as
the Association Council and the
implementation of projects in the
framework of the Phare pro-
gramme. For the "structural dia-
logue" it was felt that it is possible
to avoid long introductory political
declarations (distribute the writ-
ten texts instead of making long
speeches) and to pass immediately
to the heart of the real problems.
Another important subject
debated by the Parliamentary
Joint Committee was preparing
the 196 IGC. Mr. Elmar Brok
(one of the two EP members of Mr.
Westendorp's Reflection Group)
spoke of the state of the Group's
work. Mr. Borkowski stressed the
importance that Poland attached
to direct and regular contacts with
the bodies and people responsible
for preparing the IGC and to the
exchange of written texts. Mr.
Elmar Brok invited the Polish side
to formulate their own position
(especially on the majority voting
and on the EU second and third
pillar) and to submit a text to the
Reflection Group.
The Parliamentary Joint
Committee also spokeof the imba-
lance in trade between the EU and
Poland, aswell as effortsbeingma-
de by the Polish Government lately
in the field of environmental pro-
tection. The debate on these two
subjects (and others) will be con-
tinued and deepened at the next
meeting to take place early 1996
(most probably in January). r
RESULTS OF FIRST MEETING OF TOINT PARLUMENTARY COMMITTEE IN SOFU
The session of the joint EU/Bulgaria parliamentary committee which convened for the first time in
Sofia on 6-8 September under the co-chairmanship of Greek MEP Mr Papakyriazis (PSE) and the Bulgarian
deputy Mr Kamov, was essentially marked by an exchange of views with Bulgaria's President Mr Zhelev,
Bulgaria's Prime Minister Mr Videnov, and the President of the Bulgarian Assembly, Mr Sendov. They all
'ecognized the extenr of the challense that Bulgaria will have to meet to succeed its integration in the bU.
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Even if there exists a broad convergence of views between the Bulgarian political forces on the objective to
be achieved (ie membership in the EU), differences nonetheless remain on the national strategy to befollowed
to achieve this. Once the different political parties agree to a national action plan, Bulgaria will formally
present its membership application to the EU, he noted.
The debate within the joint parliamentary committee focused on the political, economic and social
situation in Bulgaria, the state of trade relations with the EU and the practical implementation of the White
Paper on integration in the EU's internal market.
The existing obligation to hold a visa for Bulgarian citizens wanting to come to the EU was also
discussed; the Parliamentary Committee spoke of its hope that the practice of having to hold a visa with
Bulgaria (and Romania) would be rapidly aligned to that of other Central and Eastern European States; it
also asked that the EP should deal with this at coming plenary sessions.
The economic implications of the war in former Yugoslavia for Bulgaria were also the subject of a brief
exchange ofviews; it was, moreover, observed that due to the good relation which existed with its neighbouring
countries and the Bdkan regions, Bulgaria would no doubt have an important role to play in the frameworl
of the future economic and political reconstruction of the countries affected by the war.
At the end of the discussions, the Parliamentary Committee adopted, through a consensus, a series of
recommendations to be submitted to the EU/Bulgaria Association Counci[ as well as to the EU institutions
and the Bulgarian Parliament. The next meeting of the ParliamentaryJoint Committee will take place in the
spring of 196. t
ECONOMIC AND SOCAL COMMITTEE D/SCUSSES ALB/4NA
Albania deserves special attention from the
European Union which must result in stronger rela-
tions with this country. That is the firm belief of the
EU's Economic and Social Committee (ESC), which
it e:rpressed in anown-initiative opinion on relations
(rapp.: Mr Massucci, Workers, Italy) which was
adopted by the majority (one vote against, 2 absten-
tions) in a plenary session before the summer recess.
The drafting of this voluminous opinion (36 pages)
was preceded by a visit from the rapporteur accom-
panied by experts in Albania.
The Committee listed the reasons for its point
of view and made recommendations for the institu-
tions. Among the reasons for beefing up relations
between the EU and Albania, the ESC mentions:
the geographical location of this country and its
importance for the balance in the Balkans; the
structural weakness of its economy that threatens the
democratisation process engaged with success these
past three years; the risks of conflicts of ethnic and
religious origins, worsened by the weakness of Al-
banian democracy; the observation that the move to
the market economy by a policy of privatization does
not necessarily lead to a transition to economic de-
mocracy;Albania's growing needs in terms of foreign
aid, particularly financial, that confers on this country
the characteristics of a Mediterranean non-member
country (MNC) in addition to its membership among
the family of Central and East European countries
(CEEC).
As a consequence, the Committee recom-
mends: a) financial assistance based on economic
restructuring and sectorial development, infrastruc-
tures, job creation, the development of human
resources, decentralized cooperation and private
(coruinuedonpge 8)
AIYUSTMENTTO TINION WILL BE DIFFICULT, SA}l.s FELIPE GONZ4LEZ
Sponish hime Minister and President-in-Offrce of the European Council Fetipe Gonznlez, on an
ofiicial visit to Bulgaiq stated thu the Union had the dug to &end itself to the East and that Butgaria had
the igltt to become a memben However, he stressed that adapting to an economy at EU level, with open
frontien,wotrldbe "dfficultandcomplicated". Bulgoian Pime MinisterZhanWdcnovpointedout, forhis
pot\ that, accordingto a number of expefis, his country sltould adopt about Zh(N new laws in order to conform
with Community norms. In addition, if it is dfficult forthe Spanish Govemment to frgltt against annual
inftation of 4Vo, then imagine how dfficult the task would be to fight ogainst a predicted rate of 40Vo,
concluded MrWdenov.
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investment, interregional cooperation and regional
cooperation in the Balkan area; b) the opening of
social dialogue with this country including the crea-
tion of a joint advisory committee; c) the extension of
the EU's Mediterranean policy to Albania; d) the
setting into motion of procedures to define a Euro-
pean accord based on those concluded with other
Central and East European countries. r
EP PRESIDENT MR IUENSCH PROPOSfS ORGIIMSATION OF A BALTIC SM
SI]MMN
Speoking on 12 September in Ronne (Denmark) at the opening of the 4th Parliamentaty Conference
of the Nordic Council on Cooperation in the Baltic Sea Area, Kans Hocnsch President of the Europeon
Padiament, proposed the oryanisation of a "Baltic Sea Summit" with the participation of the govemments
of all the EU Member States and of all the counties of the Baltic region. "The Baltic Sea is a European sea.
Since the end of Soviet hegemony over eostem and central Europe, the Baltic wgion is the centre of a great
histoic trutsformation. This transformation must be a great Eurupeon prcject ond the Eurupeon Union must
be part of it. We need joint and comprehensive effoft througlt all rclevant Union policies and funds, an
equivalent to the integmted Meditenanean programme at the time when the Community was prepaingfor
its enlotgement to the South", said Mr Haensch. The EP hesidcnt strssed that the EP attaches great
impoftance to the promotion of stability, democrocy and development in the Baltic region, and to further
integraion of the Baltic countries in European structures. r
WSIT BY POLISH DELEGATION FOR SOCUL DULOGW TO EUROPD4N ECONOMIC
AND SrcUL COMMITTEE ON 14-15 SEPTEMBER
On the sidelines of the plenary session that opened on 13 September, the EU's Economic and Social
Committee (ESC) received for the first time the entire Polish tripartite committee for social dialogue, which
will be welcomed by Mr Laur, Vice President of the Committee and Mr Briesch and Mr Carroll, Presidents
of the sections on external relations and social affairs. The two-day meeting (14 and 15 September) aimed at
improving the structure of future cooperation between the ESC and this committee, notably by appointing
a joint advisorycommittee like the one planned with Hungary. It is part of a series of visits by the tripartite
committee to the headquarters of the main European organizations of social partners, ie the Union of
European Confederations of Industry and Employers (UNICE), the European Trade Union Confederation
(ETUC), the European Centre for Public Enterprise (CEEP), the European Trade Union Institute, the
Central Council of the Economy and the National Labour Council of Belgium. r
MRS BONINOISSURES MR KOSTOWE TIAT HUIvI/4NEARAN AID WILL CONTINUE
On September 7, Croatian Vice Prime Minis-
ter Ivica Kostovid presented to the European Com-
mission the humanitarian needs of Croatia further to
operationsin Krajinaand theinflow of refugees from
Bosnia and Serbia-Montenegro. According to latest
estimations, 389,000 refugees or displaced persons
were in Croatia in 194. To this must be added 30,000
refugees from Croatian minorities expelled from
Banja Luka in northern Bosnia and from the inde-
pendent province ofVojvodine in northern Serbia, as
well as 25,000 Muslims evacuated from the Velina
Kladusa zone.
During a meeting with Emma Bonino,
Commissioner charged with humanitarian aid,
Mr Kostovi6 received the European [.Inion's assur-
ance that it 'lilill continue to give an adequate re-
sponse to the needs of those suffering in Croatia".
Even without a supplementary budget for former Yu-
goslavia, European humanitarian aid to the vulner-
able populations is unconditional, explained Mrs
Bonino who expressed her concern about the fate of
the displaced populations in Croatia.
The Commission had released further emer-
gencyaidof Ecu5m at thebeginningofAugustin order
to assist displaced Serbs in Krajina as well as Muslims
leaving Srebrenica and Zepa. Humanitarian assistan-
ce given by the EU to Croatia in1994l9Fi5 amounts
to more than Ecu100m (Ecu257m since 1991). r
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DEVELOPMENTS WITHIN THE EU
PROGRESS REPORT ON THE IGC
When thq meet in Formentorfor theirinfonnal Summit, on 22-2i
September, the Heads of state and government of the European Union will
have the "Progress Report" of the Reflection Group which is prepaing the
1 996 Interyovemmental Conference.
The report, which has been
drawn up by its chairman, Spanish
Secretary of State for European
Affairs Carlos Westendorp, is the
result of five sessions which have
allowed the members (permanent
representatives of the Foreigrr af-
fairs ministers, Commissioner
Marcelino Oreja and European
MPs Elmar Brok and Elisabeth
Guigou) toexamine awide range of
topics: goals of the Union, institu-
tions, internal security, foreigr pol-
icy and defence, instruments and
policies of the Union. In this ver-
sion, the report represents the per-
sonal conclusion of the Chairman:
in apress conferencein Brussels, on
5 September, Mr Westendorp felt
that his conclusions had obtained
wide agreement among the mem-
bers. Elisabeth Guigou and Elmar
Brok confirmed this (which doesn't
mean that dissenting opinions do
not exist: they will no doubt be
included in the report which will
finally be submitted to the Euro-
pean Council in Madrid, in Decem-
ber).
The presentation of the re-
port coincided with a two-day dis-
cussion within the Group on institu-
tional matters; it also coincided
with a series of events touching on
the foreign policy and security
dimension of its work (for the dis-
cussions on this chapter so far, see
Together in Europe of 15July): the
NATO strikes on Serbs and the
nuclear test in Muroroa, with the
announcement, by President
Chirac, of some kind of future ini-
tiative for the "Europeanisation" of
its nuclear deterrent. These mat-
ters were not discussed by the
Group: they will probably come up
at Formentor, or when security
matters are again discussed.
The report (some 5O-pages
long) starts with an analysis of the
goals of the Union, analysis which
confirms the need to proceed to
wide-ranging reforms to allow the
Union to face its internal and exter-
nal challenges. In the background,
a central question: what are the
Member States prepared to do
together? The answer to this ques-
tion, stresses the report, will deter-
mine how far reform can go. If one
accepts the idea that those who
want to go ahead together cannot
be stopped by others, it will be
necessary to set limits to the flexi-
bilitywithin the Union, in order to
"manage" diversity without endan-
gering the "acquis" and the com-
mon goals. What if dissent among
partners is such that one or more
members donot rati$the reform?
The question has been asked, but
the Group has not, so far, envis-
aged a "crisis scenario" for such an
outcome.
As for the challenges which
the Union has to face, the main
challenge is obviously enlarge-
ment. The Group does not have the
function of defining the criteria or
conditions for enlargement: it
stresses however that the necessary
reforms must be agreed upon be-
fore enlargement can take place.
On the principle of enlargement
itself, the report insists on the fact
that failure in this field would lead
to a serious crisis not only in the
candidate countries but also in the
Union itself. The reforms which
are nowbeing discussed are those
which are necessary to allow en-
largement to all central and east-
ern European states, Malta, C!-
prus and the Baltic states. When
actual negotiations start (at the
completion of the IGC exercise)
the approach must be global, but
with flexible adjustment formu-
las. This "time factor", which the
European Community knows
well, writes the Chairman recall-
ing successive enlargements, will
allowspecialproblems tobe taken
into account and relieve pressure
on resources and policies. As for
the possible revision of common
policies as a consequence of en-
largement, there is, for the time
being, no unanimous position:
there is, however, agreement on
the need to maintain and develop
the common acquis.
One of the most obvious
consequences of enlargement is,
withthe changesin themap ofthe
Union, an enhancement of politi-
cal stability but a need to define
the objectives and reinforce the
instruments which are needed in
this new dimension. The end of
the cold war (which makes en-
largement possible or even con-
ceivable) has altered the security
picture: the "classical" dimension
of security in the sense of guaran-
teeing territorial integrity is ac-
companied by other new and dra-
matic challenges such as internal
civil conflicts, the protection of
minorities, violations of human
rights, the risk of ecologic catas-
trophes or the irresponsible use of
modern technolog5r. If the role of
(coilinucd on pge 10)
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NATO is unanimously confirmed
asvitalfor theterritorial defence of
the Union, WEU, as the European
pillar of NATO, notes the report,
should progressively give shape to
a European security and defence
identity. On the principle of na-
tional sovereryn$ in this field, the
question iswhich measure of flexi-
bility can be introduced in order to
allow some to act with, for ex-
ample, the "constructive absten-
tion" of others.
Enlargement will also have
obvious and visible consequences
at the level of the institutions:
therefore it is essential to establish
beforehand which way changes
should go. Inadequate institu-
tional reform, stresses the report,
wouldendanger the whole process
of European construction. As far
as numbers are ooncorned" there
seems to be some oonsensus on
fuing a ma:rimum of seats in the
European Parliament (for ex-
ample 700, as the Parliament itself
has suggested). The problem of the
Commission's composition is
trickier: should one maintain the
principle "at least one national
from each member state" (with the
risk of having too large a Commis-
sion, with manymembers dissatis-
fied with their attributions and
with their visibiliry) or should one
reduce the Commission to the
portfolios which are really neces-
sary? (many think it would be be-
tween 12 and 15). As far as the
Council is concerned, the system of
rotating presidencies which now
exists would mean that each
member state would hold the
presidency at very long intervals.
One solution could be, according
tothe Group, a "team" presidency,
combining elements of permanent
and rotation; another could be the
election of a senior representative
for e:(ernal policy issues. Of
crucial importance, the deci-
'ion mechani"-" rvith a lerse
consensus for e:(ending majority
voting. Some members would like
voting to take account more for the
population factor. They argue that,
according to the present system, it
could be possible to reach the
qualified majority with a vote rep-
resentinga minorityof the popula-
tion of the Union. Others recall
that there has never beeq in prac-
tice, a systematic coalition behn een
less populated states against the
most populated (but, one could
argue, the picture will be quite dif-
ferent in a Union of twenty-five
members or more).
Another internal challenge
which is made more urgent by the
prospect of enlargement is the
challenge offreedom for the Euro-
pean citizens and internal security.
On the frst point, the Group con-
siders that it would be appropriate
to introduce into the treaty an ar-
ticle providing the possibility of
expelling a member state that does
not recognize fundamental human
rights (a catalogue of rights should
include condemnation of racism
and xenophobia and a general
clause of non-discriminatioq while
there is no unanimity on a ban of
the death penalty, protection of
minorities and socio'economic
rights). The Union will also have to
guarantee more effectively its
internal security: the situation in
this field is generally considered
not very satisfactory altho.,gh not
all agree on the reasonwhy. Some
think that the provisions of the
treaty and the institutional mecha-
nismsare inadequate, s1[s15 6leim
thatwhat is missing is political will
and practical experience. In his
press conference, Carlos Westen-
dorp recognized that cooperation
needs strong mechanisms: Sch-
engen, with its small secretariat,
does "what it can".
The last chapter of the re-
port deals with the "instru-
ments" serving the Union: norms,
resources, policies. Subsidiarity is,
as in Maastricht, one of the recur-
rent words: predictably, the British
representative was particularly
eager to have this principle in-
scribed inthe newtreaty. The value
of subsidiarity is recogrized by all,
but the majority stresses that, while
it should not remain an abstract
principle, it should not become a
means of systematically reducing
the competence of the Union.
Some would even favour political
control on implementation of this
principle, for instance by the na-
tional parliaments.
As far as policies are con-
cerned, the Group states (and this
was forcefully confirmed during
the press conference, by Carlos
Westendorp on one side and by
Elisabeth Guigou and Elmar Brok
on the other) that the conditions
and agenda for the single currency
must notbe modified and that eco-
nomic and monetary union must go
ahead. Some members, however,
would like the "social content" of
the treaty to be reinforced. The
Swedish representative, Gunnar
Lund presented speciFrc propos-
als, based on the recognition (by
all) that unemployment is number
one among the "real" problems
which the Union must tackle.
The Swedish paper suggests
introducing a new "Employment
chapter in the treaty, which would
set out common aims, commit-
ments and procedures to attain full
employment, among other things
through greater flexibility on the
work market. This new chapter
should contain articles charging the
Social Council and the Ecofin
Council with the task of formulat-
ing and updating annual draft
guidelines on employment policies
by the member states and the Un-
ion, to be submitted to the Euro-
pean Council, as well as with the
task of evaluating progress and
consistency with these guidelines.
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A strengthening of the social dia-
logue is also necessary according to
theSwedes, in order to improve the
links betrveen the decentralized
decisions makers on the labour
market and the formulation of
broader economic and employment
policy at the level of the member
states and of the Union.
As could be expected, these
suggestions were snubbed by David
Davis, representative of the British
Foreign minister: the British gov-
ernment thinks that just this kind of
policy is responsible fs1 ths high
unemployment in the Union. But
the German representatives was
also less than enthusiastic about it.
As for the agenda of the
Conference (when shall it start,
when could it end?), Carlos
Westendorp was definite about its
beginning: it should take place
under the ltalian presidency, i.e. in
the frst half of 1996. He feels it
could be completed by the end of
that year. And Elisabeth Guigou
saysthat, the better the conference
is prepared, the shorter it can be.
In Bonn, Chancellor Kohl felt that
it could be hardly e:rpected to see
the conference completed before
mid-1997.
GERMAN WEW ON THE DOIRATION OF THE ECSC TRMTYAND FUTURE OF STEEL
INDUSTRY
Strict discipline on public aids, the creation of
fair conditions of competition on world markets and
firm determination to develop innovation constitute
the essentialbasis for thelong-term protection ofjobs
in the steel sector. These were the unanimously
agreed conclusions of the highJevel meetingbetween
Mr Rexrodt, Federal Minister for the Economy, and
the social partners in the German steel sector, one in
a series of similar conferences now being organized
by the federal government in Bonn and leaders in the
principal industrial sectors (cars, chemicals, etc.) on
the future of industry in the Federal Republic of
Germany.
All participants shared an essentially positive
view of the present situation in the steel sector: sales
and financial results are higher in 1995 than last year,
although future developments are risky notably due
to the revaluation of the D-Mark, low demand for
sonsumer products and a decline in the building
sector in western Germany. Additional structural
adaptation measures are therefore inevitable.
At the centre of discussions were the frame-
work conditions for the steel industry following the
expiration of the ECSCTreaty lul.?fff2. Mr Renodt
confirmed that he will endeavor at Community level
toobtain thecreation of an ECSC ResearchFounda-
tion to be financed out ofEuropean Coal and Steel
Communityreserveg but he sees little hope of main-
taining the programme of construction of workers'
housing and of the ECSC levy after e;rpiration of the
Treaty. He expressed reservations against the levy as
a particular tax imposed on specific industrial sectors.
For their part, representatives of the industry and
trade unionists insisted on maintaining a strict policy
regarding state aids after the e:rpiration of theTreaty,
and in order to prevent any further crises, developing
an information system ensuring transparency on
markets and in investments. They also argued for
consultation procedures and instruments provided for
under the ECSCTreaty. Mr Re:nodt iswilling to lend
his support to these demands insofar as they are in
conformity with the rules of competition of the EEC
Treaty, but steel producers and workers consider the
EEC framework insufficient: in the event of a crisis, it
would be impossible, in their view, to do without the
more flexible rules of competition enshrined in the
ECSC Treaty.
All the colloquium participants consider the
restructuring of the steel industry to be a permanent
process. In thegradual privatization ofEuropean steel
industries, the Minister and industry see a chance for
an approximation of competitionconditions in the dif-
ferent Member States, but industry representatives
have asked the government to ensure that enterprises
that are privatized are not given a competitive edge
through an absorption of their debt.
View on east European steel industryr
The necessity of admitting the central and east-
ernEuropean countries into the European Union and
of gradually abolishing barriers between them and the
common marketwas also recognized unanimously, as
was these countries'inability to proceed on their own
with theessential adjustments this processwill require.
Mr Rexrodt therefore appealed to the Community
industry to assist these countries in restructuring their
steel industries.
The German steel industry is in principle pre-
pared to make such an undertaking which should
nevertheless be matched with Community action. In
any event, the opening of markets between western
and eastern Europe must be in line with GATT and
WTO rules on international trade. The central and
(conrirucd otp6e 12)
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COMMISSION GUIDELINES FOR CROSS-BORDER TRANSFER PAYMENTS
On September 13, the Commission adopted guidelines for the application of the competition rules to
cross-border.."6i1 llansfer systerns, to speed up cross-border payrnents and prevent banks from charging
bothsender andreceiver for atransaction. The proposed directive requiresbanls to provide moreinformation
to their customers, enabling greater efficiency without restricting competition. It also provides that costs
arising from a cross-border credit transfer should be bom by the senderunless he or she instructs otherwise.
This is the culmination of two independent studies, following the proposal for the Directive in October 194.
The "work programme" involved discussions withBanking andusergroups onthe waln inwhich thepayment
systems can be best prepared for the introduction of the Ecu; progress within an existing Task Force of
government experts, on harmonising procedures for reporting balance of payments statistics; discussions with
legal experts, central bank representatives and the EMI on harmonis-
ing the legal framework for cross-border palments. Inter alia the results
of the 194 study (with 1993 results in brackets), is a study on time for
execution of transfers. The average total tlme was 4.8 (4.6) working days.
Averages in the different Member States ranged betrveen three and
eight working days. The average time taken was in line with the
Commission recommendation which allows for a maximum of two
working days per bank involved in a transferl fhe Droposed Directive
Number of uorking dap Proportion of payments
arriraed
Cumulative proportion ol
paynents arrirad
4
5
6
>6
l9.2Vol24.Wol
l6.lVo ll7.2Vol
9.7Vo l9.L%ol
l5.4Vo tS.4Vol
S8.8Vo[6l.0Vol
74.9Vol78.2Vol
U.6Vol87.3Vol
1OA.Oo/n
sets out the conditions for credit transfers between member states.
Regarding delays, the directive requiresbanks to complete cross-border
payments within the time scale agreed between the customer making or
receivingthe palment at his bank.In the absence of an agreement, the
directiveputs the onus on theoiginator'sbankto ensurethat the transfer
was completed within five working days, and puts the onus on the
beneficiary's bank to ensure that the money was at the disposal of the
beneficiary within one working day, (total of six working days in all).
Penalties could be incurred by the banks. The directive could oblige the
oi$natoy's bank to pay interest to the client making the transfer, if the
transfer is not completed within the agreed timescale, or the five day
maximum timescale in the directive. Similarly, the beneficiary's bank
would be liable to pay interest to the beneficiary of the credit transfer
for any delay exceeding the agreed time scale, or, in the absence of one,
exceeding one day betrveen the arrival of the payment at the destination
bank and its availability to the beneficiary. Unauthorised double-
charging will be illegal. The directive is due to be discussed at the
September 18 ECOFIN Council. The main outstanding issue from a
previous Ecofin Council (in July), concerns whether the Directive's
overall rules should apply only to transfers below a certain threshold
and whether the obligation to reimburse lost transfers should be limited
to sums below a given threshold (Commission proposes Ecu10,000). An
overall threshold was not included in the Commission is revised prc-
posal; during its first reading the EP suggested both thresholds at
Ecu50,000, and in the July Ecofin, the Presidency srrggested the follo-
wing: overah threshold of Ecu25,000,8cu7,500 for reimbursement. This
did not gain the support of qualified majority.It is expected that a new
compromise will revise the thresholds upwards. r
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eastern European countries
should liberalize and open up their
raw materials markets, notably
scrap, to their Western partners.
Industry and workers alike also
acknowledged the need to help the
Eastern European countries adjust
their production capacities under
socially acceptable conditions and
to provide support in regard to
regional policy. r
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